



A UK ‘Basic Income’? Testing the Limits of Universality               
 
Proponents of Basic Income (BI) argue that BI schemes can deliver universal, unconditional 
support more effectively than conventional social security programmes. This paper examines 
that claim. Consideration is given to the form BI schemes can take, and their attractions, before 
turning to the concerns. These include issues around popular support, fiscal feasibility, and the 
potentially negative distributional outcomes for those lower down the income distribution or who 
are reliant on targeted programmes in key areas like housing, childcare, disability, and in-work 
support – particularly if a BI scheme displaces (or partially displaces) such programmes. There 
have been important evaluations. Nevertheless, further work is needed before firm conclusions 
on the merits of BI schemes can be reached. In the meantime, as many States, including the 
UK, implement massive income replacement schemes in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, 
calls to adopt simpler, more universal BI-type schemes can be expected to grow. In the UK, 
much of the focus will be on the performance of Universal Credit. 
Keith Puttick, Associate Professor of Law, Staffordshire University, UK 
1. Introduction 
Basic Income (BI) – variously described as a Universal  Basic Income, Citizen’s Income, Social 
Dividend, Guaranteed Income, or in other similar terms - is a simple idea. According to the 
Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), the leading BI international network, it can be defined as 
a “periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without means 
test or work requirement”.1 The concept has a long history reaching back to the 16th century2, 
and even further to schemes in the Islamic world.3    
The idea is attractive. On the face of it, universal, unconditional payments made from BI 
programmes could offer significant advantages over the targeting, conditionality, and means-
testing that feature in many social security schemes. As well as obviating (or at least reducing) 
the need for complex legal infrastructures, adjudication, and administration, and the 
unwelcome baggage of “sanctioning” as an adjunct to conditionality and labour activation4, 
proponents say it can offer a secure basic income cushion for all, irrespective of their 
resources and level of labour market participation. Recipients can then build on it, whether 
through employment, self-employment, entrepreneurship, or other creative activities. For 
some advocates, such “security” is increasingly needed in the face of challenging labour 
market conditions, underemployment, the threat to jobs from automation and new 
technology5,disruptions like the 2007/2008 financial crisis and recession, and the Covid-19 
pandemic.  
 
1  BIEN “About Basic Income”: https://basicincome.org/basic-income/ last accessed 4 April 2020. 
2  BIEN “History of Basic Income”: https://basicincome.org/basic-income/history/ last accessed 4 April 2020. 
3  There is evidence of income payment schemes for needy people from at least 632 CE and the Rashidun Caliphate of Abdullah 
ibn Abi Quhaafah (Abu Bakr), father-in-law of the Prophet Muhammed. Vestiges of that legacy may still be seen in welfare 
measures like Pakistan’s Zhakat and Ushr; G. Clarke Pakistan’s Zhakat and Ushr as a Welfare System: An Islamic Public Welfare 
System in a Developing Country (Baltimore: University of Maryland Press, 1985). 
4 On the many issues around conditionality and sanctioning, see P. Dwyer “Sanctions within social security” (2018) 25 JSSL, 
Issue 3, 142-157; and P. Dwyer “Citizenship, conduct and conditionality: sanction and support in the 21st century UK welfare 
state” in M. Fenger et al (eds),  Social Policy Review 28: Analysis and debate in social policy 2016 (Bristol Policy Press, 2016), 
pp.41-62.  
5  D. Susskind, A World Without Work (London: Allen Lane, 2020). The scale of displacement of jobs from automation and new 




The debates about BI have been intensifying in different countries, including Finland where 
there has been a limited basic income “experiment”6, and in the UK where three political 
parties – Labour, the Green Party, and the Liberal Democrats - included BI proposals, or 
variants, in their 2019 General Election manifestos7. In Scotland, the Scottish National Party 
has supported the introduction of a Citizens Basic Income (CBI), and the Scottish Government 
is assisting trials by four councils.8 The Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Social Security and 
Older People, Shirley-Ann Somerville, informed the Scottish Parliament that the Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions was co-operating in the trials.9 One of the interesting features of 
the Scottish project is the attention being given to the political feasibility of a CBI scheme.10 
Unsurprisingly, the need for public engagement and “political consensus” features strongly in 
the guidance from the International Labour Organisation and World Health Organisation on 
schemes in social protection floors.11 The issue is challenging as the UK has been seeing with 
Universal Credit (UC). Indeed, at one stage  the scale of concern among MPs after a lengthy 
debate in the House of Commons in 2017 led MPs to vote to demand a suspension of UC’s 
national roll-out.12  In contrast to recent experiences with UC, there are examples of where 
schemes have not just commanded significant initial support, that support  has generally 
continued after  their introduction. This could be fairly said of a range of contributory benefits 
in the contributory regime, and indeed the contributory principle itself as it was envisaged by 
 
of Workplace Automation” Journal of Economic Perspectives Volume 29, Number 3, Summer 2015: 3-30; R. Gordon, The Rise 
and Fall of American Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016) 602-604; and P. Krugman, “What Will Cause the Next 
Recession: Paul Krugman on UBI and More”, 22 April 2019 (“To say that we must have UBI, that would only make sense if we 
were right on the verge of the robots taking all of our jobs…there’s no sign that’s happening”): 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ja2PY2CnpOQ 
 
6  On the two-year randomised controlled trial which began in January 2017, its design and objectives, and preliminary results, 
see L Kaliomaa-Puha, A. Tuovinen, O. Kangas, “The Basic Income Experiment in Finland”, [2016] JSSL, 23(2), 75-78, 77, and 
J. De Wispelaere, A. Halmetoja, V. Pulla, “The Rise (and Fall) of the Basic Income Experiment in Finland”, CESofa Forum 3/2018 
September, Volume 19, pp.15-19; and see N. Harris, “Who Wants Basic Income?” (2016) Journal of Social Security Law, 23(2): 
65-66. 
7  It’s Time for Real Change: The Labour Party Manifesto 2019 (London: The Labour Party, 2019), p.60; and If Not Now, When? 
Manifesto 2019 (London: The Green Party, 2019), p.26; Liberal Democrats: Stop Brexit, Build a Better Future (London: Liberal 
Democrats, 2019), p.6 (offering development grants: “[We] will put £4,000 into people’s ‘Skills Wallet’ at 25, £3,000 at 40 and 
another £3,000 at 55. The grants have been designed to encourage saving towards the costs of education and training throughout 
adult life. Individuals, their employers and local government will be able to make additional payments into the wallets.”). 
8  Scottish Basic Income Steering Group, Exploring the Practicalities of a Basic Income Pilot (Carnegie UK Trust, 2019), p.9: 
https://www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk/publications/exploring-the-practicalities-of-a-basic-income-pilot/ 
9  Official Report, Meeting of the Parliament 27th March 2019: Shirley-Ann Somerville: “We have had reassurances from the 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, who has offered co-operation [with the pilot]. We are certainly taking her up on that 
offer because we need to build understanding of the scale and scope of the work, and we need the UK Government to carry on 
in partnership with us in that process.”  
10   Exploring the Practicalities of a Basic Income Pilot, n.8 above. Other specific questions are whether a CBI would be “readily 
understood” and be “seen to be beneficial by the community”; and what are the levels of public support given the unconditional 
nature of a CBI; and would it “fit with existing societal norms around need and contribution?”. 
11  Social Protection Floor for a Fair and Inclusive Globalisation: Report of the Advisory Group Chaired by Michelle Bachelet 
(Geneva: International Labour Organisation, and World Health Organisation, 2011). Two of the most important “lessons” are that 
programmes benefit from sufficient development time, and besides effective institutional arrangements and delivery technologies 
their “implementation should be based on national consensus”, not least because mistakes can be costly and undermine public 
confidence; Executive Summary, xxvi, ch.4.  
 
12  HC Deb, Vol 629, 15 Oct 2017, cols 860 et seq. This came after it heard a litany of complaints about constituents’ negative 
experiences of the system, and a report from the Trussell Trust about the rise in take-up of food bank help by UC recipients (Early 




William Beveridge in his report13 to the government in 1942.14  Indeed, it is this positive  feature 
of the system that prompted calls by some commentators for an expansion of the contributory  
system, and its “something for something” values, as a way of regaining public trust and 
support, reversing the poor support for means-tested benefits, and reducing the stigma of 
claiming.15 Public support was also a vital element in gaining the government’s commitment 
to non-contributory schemes like Family Allowance in 194516, and again in 1975 when child 
tax relief and family allowance were merged into Child Benefit (described at the time by the 
Secretary of State for Social Services, Barbara Castle, as a “new universal, non-means tested, 
tax-free cash benefit”).17 Arguably, the benefit remains the closest thing the UK has to a 
universal basic income. Strong public support was needed again in the mid-1980s at the time 
of the Fowler Reviews in the mid-1980s18 when it looked as if it might be taxed, means-tested, 
or absorbed into new means-tested provision. In the event, an alliance of organisations, Save 
Child Benefit, was started by the Child Poverty Action Group and this campaigned, 
successfully, for it to continue.19   
Unfortunately, gaining public support for a social security system which includes non-
contributory, universal components is not helped by the  hostility which sections of the media 
habitually display towards the system and claimants. Mr Thomas Roche, unemployed resident 
of Eltham, South-East London, and father of eight, experienced this first-hand. Towards the 
end of 2019 he won nearly £4 million on his first attempt at the “slots”, Bet 365’s £2-a-Go Reel 
King. The media soon discovered that he was a benefits claimant, and that agencies had told 
him he could continue to receive most of his benefits. Whilst he was, indeed, “unemployed” a 
fairer, more appropriate descriptor would have been “carer” as he had given up a job to 
become a carer for a child with autism who had qualified for Disability Living Allowance. Since 
then the family’s support comprised Income Support as the lead means-tested benefit, Child 
 
13  Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services (Chair: Sir William Beveridge) Social 
Insurance and Allied Services (Beveridge Report) (London: HM Stationery Office, 1942), Cm 6404. 
14  The government, for its part, noted how the scheme was ’pre-eminently not a plan for giving to everybody something for 
nothing and without trouble’: rather it was a plan to secure to each citizen an income adequate to satisfy a natural 'minimum 
standard’ on ‘condition of service and contribution…’; and echoing Beveridge’s often-quoted observation that ‘benefit in return for 
contributions rather than free allowances from the State is what the people of Britain desire’. (para D21). It added that ‘whatever 
money is required for provision of insurance benefits should come from a Fund to which the recipients have contributed’ (p.3); 
War Cabinet Summary of Report Social Insurances and Allied Services by Sir William Beveridge: Confidential WP (42) 547, 25th 
November 1942 (National Archives, accessed 12th November 2019). National Assistance support was outside the scheme (p.9).  
15  K. Bell and D. Gaffney, Making a Contribution: Social Security for the Future (London: TUC/Touchstone, 2012), 10. The authors 
put such factors forward in their argument for a “renewed focus on contribution”, and improvements to what contributors can 
expect from the system, ie “something for something”. 
16  Much of the groundwork in building public support for family allowances before 1945 had already been done by pioneers like 
Eleanor Rathbone and the Family Endowment Committee. Rathbone had long contended that children were a “community asset” 
and that the community should not leave their support and welfare provision to the family, or the “accident of private income”; E. 
Rathbone, The Case for Family Allowances (London: Penguin, 1940), developing themes in her earlier book, The Disinherited 
Family, first published in 1924 (London: Falling Wall, 1986). It was also implicit by 1945 that mothers should have control of that 
income given their need for independence and role as workers; S. Pedersen, Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare 
State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 145. 
17  HC Official Report (5th Series) Vol.892 (13th May 1975), col 330. She also commented that “It may be premature to talk of 
giving the wife and mother her own wage, but she certainly needs control of her own budget if the family is to be fed and clothed.” 
The scheme had been widely debated and supported as part of the  Labour Party’s family and social security policies, including 
those in Labour’s Social Strategy, Into the Seventies (London: Labour Party Executive Committee,1969). 
18  For a valuable account of reviews and reforms in this period, see N. Harris, “Widening Agendas: The Social Security Reviews 
and Reforms of 1985-8” in N. Harris (ed.), Social Security Law in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 119-151. 
19  The main in-roads to CB’s universality have come from withholding it from those without a “right to reside”, and since 2013  
HMRC can claw back payments from households with a higher rate taxpayer; “Child Benefit and Guardian’s Allowance: Where it 
All Started”, Revenue Benefits (Low Incomes Tax Reform Group/LASA), 22nd July 2018. The price for its near-universality has 
been that governments have kept it as a relatively small, low-value low payment. Expansion of family support has largely been 




Benefit, Child Tax Credit, Housing Benefit as they rented their council home, and Disability 
Living Allowance in respect of the son with autism. Having duly notified the relevant agencies 
of his “change of circumstances”20 he was no doubt surprised to be told that at least three 
benefits - Child Benefit (CB), Child Tax Credit (CTC), and Disability Living Allowance (DLA) – 
would still be paid.21 In the days that followed press  hostility intensified .22 A fairer, rather more 
supportive account, was provided in other reports.23   
Scenarios like this provide a valuable case study, not least in the way that such media stories 
feed into a narrative about a “something for nothing” benefits culture, but also in the way that 
some sections of the press do not appear to understand (or perhaps do not want to 
understand) the rationale for the continuing availability of benefits like CB, CTC, and DLA to 
claimants with resources. Part of the problem, it has been suggested, is that means-tested 
and non-contributory benefits - having evolved as the “poor relative” of Beveridge’s 
contributory system - never benefited from the “strong rationale” and public understanding that 
Beveridge forged for contribution-based schemes.24  
None of this bodes well for a scheme like universal BI which would enable payments to be 
made to recipients higher up the income distribution – indeed all the way to the top - even if 
under some BI variants  they may be expected to pay tax on them. As considered later, those 
trialling BI schemes in Scotland understand this well, and have factored the issue into plans 
to engage the public and win informed support.  
In the bigger picture, this begs the question what role universalism should still be playing in 
the delivery of State programmes  and services? Despite attractions like “simplification” that 
universality might offer, current trends in the UK, although not necessarily in other European 
 
20  A duty to notify changes is placed firmly on claimants as a result of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 s.71; Social 
Security (Claims and Payments) Regulations 1987, SI 1987/1968, reg.32; and leading cases like R(SB) 15/87), CG/4494/99, and 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Hinchy [2006] UKHL 16. They must do this if they wish to avoid recovery of 
overpayments for failing to disclose such changes. 
21  H. Goodwin’ “Dad-of-8 won £4m on slots but can still claim benefits”, Metro (London, 17th December 2019) 9. CB and DLA are 
non-means tested, sometimes described as “universal”, benefits; and they would not have been affected by the couple’s newly 
acquired capital. CTC is a means-tested benefit. However, until a recipient receives income – for example after it has been 
invested and starts to generate interest - eligibility and payments under an existing CTC award continue. HMRC guidance on 
“Changes you should report” refers to “any change in income”, adding that this must be done “immediately” if it goes up or down 
by £2500; see “Report changes that affect your tax credits”: https://www.gov.uk/changes-affect-tax-credits last accessed 18th 
December 2019. Reminders to claimants to report changes are routinely provided through their on-line accounts. 
22  R. Ardehali, “Jobless father, 30, and his wife who won £3.75m on gambling website Bet365 are still claiming up to £3,000-a-month 
in benefits while splashing out on five cars, an £850,000 six-bedroom home and a quad bike”, Daily Mail On-Line (London, 16th Dec 
2019: last accessed 20th December 2019)). A similar report, reporting that Mr Roche had “infuriated friends by keeping his 
handouts” appeared the day before in an “exclusive” in The Sun; D. Sales, “HANDOUT FURY Family who won £3.75million on 
gambling website are claiming up to £3,000 a month in benefits” (The Sun, 15th December 2019): 
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/10558436/millionaire-family-claiming-3k-benefits/ last accessed 20th December 2019. 
23  In an account criticising the “bad picture” that she felt had been painted of her husband, Mrs Roche pointed out that he was, in 
every sense, the carer of their autistic son who needed his father to be “on hand all day, every day"; L. Skoulding “£4 million bets 
winner slams ‘lies’ that family are still claiming benefits: please don’t believe everything you read”, MyLondon, (London, 17th 
December 2019: https://www.mylondon.news/news/south-london-news/4-million-bets-winner-slams-17436953: last accessed 
20th December 2019). Interestingly, her other observation that “Yes, we are travellers” highlighted another sensitive issue. This 
is the discrimination and prejudice this group can still encounter; see Kate Green MP, “Discrimination and abuse against Gypsies 
and Travellers remains widespread” (London: The House Magazine, 15th May 2019). In relation to inequalities and unequal 
treatment when accessing services, housing, benefits, etc, see S. Cemlyn et al, Inequalities Experienced by Traveller 
Communities: A Review (Manchester: Equality and Human Rights Commission), Research Report 12, 2009. 
24  Furthermore, it has been argued, their legitimacy was “never properly established”, and this has enabled them to be more 
easily portrayed as somehow part of the system’s systemic failure: that “disapproval” could then be easily extended to those who 




countries, point inexorably to moves away from universal provision.25 At regional and local 
level, authorities and agencies have generally tried to keep services as widely available as 
possible: but particularly since 2010 and the onset of austerity they have come under 
increasing pressure from central government  to “target” support. The experience of Wales, 
for example, since 2010 provides valuable insights. One Wales commitments under the 
Labour-Plaid Cymru coalition extended support under schemes like free school breakfasts 
and milk for youngest children, free bus travel for all pensioners, disabled people, and carers, 
free prescriptions, and free swimming passes for all children at week-ends and in school 
holidays. They were designed to provide the community  with core, universally available 
services. This could then be supplemented by additional support for those with specific needs 
as a form of ‘progressive universalism”. This combined approach made political sense. It 
widened the range of stakeholders benefiting from schemes and who could be expected to 
support them. It also avoided a risk of services being perceived as simply for “poor people” , 
and end up as poor services.26 Another risk for universal provision is  that in a time of austerity 
“budgetary constraints” can be more  readily put forward as a justification for displacing such 
schemes and services; or limiting them by increased “targeting”. An assumption is sometimes  
made that, once reduced, the amounts allocated to a particular scheme can be more  easily 
protected, and be less at risk of further  change.27  In practice, this has often not been the 
case, as seen with successive cuts to local authority provision for community care since 2010. 
These continued, particularly in domiciliary care and other services, despite the 
“rationalisation” of eligibility criteria and greater targeting of support.28 
In general, as part of a shift in the balance between universal, contribution-based, and means-
tested support, current trends in social security provision are generally  towards focused 
support on newer, increasingly needy groups.  This includes people with needs related to  
disability and mental health; ; those with sharply rising housing costs who are then more reliant 
on discretionary assistance; and those in in-work poverty (a sizeable and growing cohort, 
despite the decline in the number of workless households from 19.2 per cent in 2010 to 13.6 
per cent in 2019. 29   
Up-to-date analysis of “who is poor today” also informs arguments about the need for policy 
makers to switch resources away from  categories like pensioners living in relative poverty 
(after housing costs) given that this group’s numbers fell by over a third in the last 20 years. 
 
25  L. Gardiner, “The shifting shape of social security: charting the changing size and shape of the British welfare system” (London: 
Resolution Foundation, November 2019). 
26  S. Hatherley “Sustainable public spending: The choice between universalism and targeting” (Cardiff: Research Service, 
National Assembly for Wales). 
27  Ibid, p.2. 
28 For example, most local authorities ceased (or reduced) support for groups not in the “critical” category of need under the 
assessment framework in the Fair Access to Service guidance (Department of Health, 2003), and then did much less if anything 
for groups in the lower categories of “substantial”, “moderate”, or “low”. Problems continued after 2010 when FACS was 
superseded by guidance in Prioritising Need in the Context of Putting People First: A Whole System Approach to Eligibility for 
Social Care – Guidance on Eligibility Criteria for Adult Social Care (Department of Health, 2010). Unfortunately, in the years that 
followed, services continued to be affected by cuts, as highlighted in reports of the Local Government Association over this period. 
Furthermore, the courts accepted local authorities’ right to plead a “lack of resources” as a defence to reduced provision in care 
plans; R (McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (Age UK Intervening) [2011] 4 All ER 881, Supreme Court.  
29  L. Gardiner, “The shifting shape of social security: charting the changing size and shape of the British welfare system” (London: 




In contrast, child poverty, including children with a parent in employment, is close to a record 
high (dictating a need for increased provision).30 
On the face of it, universal BI schemes funded in part by the removal or reduction of such 
targeted schemes are the antithesis of what is needed after a decade of austerity, and the 
impacts this has had on peoples’ welfare.  However, the point needs fuller consideration, not 
least because some organisations that back universal BI,  and other BI variants, do recognise 
the need for a partial retention of existing programmes.   
Before looking at this more closely it is worth looking at BI, the typology of schemes, and BI 
schemes’ “welfare” role. 
 
2. Basic Income as “Welfare” 
A basic income (BI) scheme may take a variety of forms. The central component in most 
schemes, however, is a regular, unconditional, and recurring payment of income made by the 
State to citizens and other eligible groups. The Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) definition 
referred to in the last section has been developed further by reference to what it sees as five 
core characteristics of Basic Income.31   
The first is that it is periodic. Ie it is paid at regular intervals (for example every month), and 
not as a one-off grant or dividend.32  The second is that it takes the form of a cash payment 
paid in an appropriate medium of exchange, thereby allowing those who receive it to decide 
what they spend it on. It is not, therefore, paid either in kind - such as food or services - or in 
vouchers dedicated to a specific use. Interestingly, some proponents universal provision differ 
in putting  forward schemes that would deliver universal basic services in preference to income 
payments.33 The third is that Basic Income should be paid on an individual basis and not, for 
instance, to households. The fourth is that the payments should be universal, that is paid to 
all, and without a means test. Fifth, that it should be unconditional and paid without a 
requirement to work or to demonstrate willingness-to-work. In practical terms this would not 
just mean initial eligibility for such support, it would continue irrespective of later changes such 
as a change family circumstances, marital status, or household composition. The focus on 
individual entitlement rather than by reference to household characteristics or needs, or a 
household means-test, has been stressed by other UBI proponents such as the RSA.34   
 
30  Ibid, p.8. 
31  BIEN About Basic Income: https://basicincome.org/basic-income/ last accessed 3 April 2020. 
32  An example is the dividend paid by the Alaskan Permanent Fund to residents settled in the state. 
33  Social Prosperity Network Report in Association with J. Portes, A. Percy, A. Reed, Social Prosperity for the Future: A Proposal 
for Universal Basic Services (London: Institute for Global Prosperity, University College London, 2017). “Focusing on basic 
services, such as housing, food, communications and transport, is, we conclude, far more effective [than basic income] at driving 
down the cost of living than spending the same money on existing services, or on redistribution.” Putting forward what they 
describe as a “blueprint for an enhanced but affordable social safety net”, the authors argue that “Expanding universal access to 
basic services is the most effective way to bolster the public goods on which both society and the economy depend”, and “The 
benefits such investment in social infrastructure brings are much greater than those targeted at individuals.” (Foreword, Prof. 
Henrietta Moore, Director, Institute for Global Prosperity, p.6). 
34  A. Painter and C. Thoung, Creative Citizen, Creative State: The Principled and Pragmatic Case for a Universal Basic Income 
(London: Royal Society of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce, 2015), p.4; Why Universal Basic Income? (London: RSA, 2018); 
and Pathways to Universal Basic Income: The Case for a Universal Basic Opportunity Fund (London: RSA, 2018). Other 
commentators have underlined the importance of unconditionality in the take up of Basic Income; Philippe Van Parijs “Basic 
Income: A Simple and Powerful Idea for the Twenty-First Century”, (2004) Politics and Society 32(1), 7-39. To some extent this 
reflects a perception of UBI as a fundamental citizenship right that transcends rationales based on needs versus resource 




For most BI models, universality is all-important. Nevertheless, there are likely to be some 
important in-roads to this, including lack of access by non-nationals and residents excluded 
as a result of nationality and residence requirements. Perhaps this is the inevitable corollary 
of formulating UBI as a citizenship right. The position of groups like asylum claimants is 
unclear, but it is unlikely they would be permitted to benefit from BI given successive 
governments’ record of keeping support to subsistence level and ratcheting up conditionality.35 
Advocates like the Progressive Economy Forum are reluctant to use terms like “universal” or 
“citizens” given that their schemes exclude non-nationals, non-resident UK nationals, or those 
who are unable to satisfy “residence” requirements.36 Arguably, such exclusions do not just 
undermine the whole notion of universality and unconditionality. They may produce other 
negative consequences such as the creation of two distinct groups within a host State, and 
particularly its labour market. First, a “Team A” made up of  workers and other participants 
with settled status who would enjoy the benefits of a secure, secondary floor of income from 
the State, as they do now with most in-work benefits; and, second, a “Team B”, comprising 
residents who do not have such status, and who would therefore be  residing and working on 
significantly less advantageous terms. Whilst the latter group would continue to have access 
to the UK’s social insurance based (contributory) benefits, it is likely that means-tested, non-
contributory benefits - generally financed out of taxation - will increasingly be reserved to UK 
citizens and those with more settled residence status. Such workers are also more likely to be 
open to exploitation, particularly in the UK’s ten or so low pay sectors where minimum wage 
employment is more common, and where State in-work support is especially important. Post-
Brexit, and without the protection currently secured  by the EU’s “equal treatment” legislation, 
Team B is liable to be particularly vulnerable.37  
The introduction of a BI scheme may be on the basis that it replaces all or much of the support 
already being provided by welfare benefit entitlements or, alternatively, does so with retention 
of some kinds of social security support.38 Within the general definition of BI, schemes might 
broadly come within the scope of a “full” scheme on the basis that they are  stable in size and 
frequency” and high enough, in terms of value, to be, in combination with other social services, 
part of a policy strategy to eliminate material poverty and to enable the social and cultural 
participation of every individual. Alternatively, they may be a “partial” scheme. This is seen by 
BIEN as a scheme that would not be a “full substitute for other redistributive measures, but 
would provide a low – and slowly increasing – basis on which other incomes, including the 
 
a “demogrant” provided by a political community to all its members without reference to such criteria. The reference to a political 
community and its “members” is redolent of the work of Michael Walzer in which he talked of distributive justice presupposing a 
“bounded world” in which the members of a political community divide, exchange, and share social goods; M. Walzer, Spheres 
of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983) 31.  
35  L. Scullion “Seeker, Refugees and Welfare Conditionality in the UK”, (2018) JSSL 25(3), 158. In the case of asylum seekers, 
and possibly even those with refugee status, it is not difficult to anticipate objections to according these groups the same level of 
support from a UBI as citizens or other nationals with more settled residence status. 
36  In the Progressive Economy Forum model a “usual residence” test would operate; G. Standing, Basic Income as Common 
Dividends, Piloting a Transformative Policy: A Report for the Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer (London: Progressive 
Economy Forum, 2019).  
37  The issues (and concerns) are set out more fully in K. Puttick “EEA Workers' Free Movement and Social Rights after Dano 
and St Prix: Is a Pandora's Box of New Economic Integration and 'Contribution' Requirements Opening?” Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law (2015) Volume 37(2), 1-21. Much will depend , of course, on post-Brexit arrangements agreed with the 
EU for its nationals in the UK (and vice versa). Arguably, having such a twoteam system would, in time, undermine the terms and 
conditions (and job security) of Team A as low-paying employers will have incentives to recruit Team B workers. 
38  N. Harris, “Who Wants Basic Income?” (2016) JSSL  23(2): 65-66. Examples of partial retention of existing schemes are 
considered later in this paper. The RSA Basic Income model, for example, recognised that it may be necessary to modify the 
proposed Citizen’s Income to provide additional assistance for families with children who are not yet of school age given that the 




remaining social security benefits and means-tested guaranteed income supplements, could 
be added”.   
Interestingly, some BI supporters see the “partial” option as an important path on the road to 
an eventual full BI. Others see the need for a full system as more pressing – particularly in the 
face of evidence of the current social security system’s breakdown, and given the scale and 
impact of the system’s failures. Advocates of  a partial (or modified) system recognise that a 
full scheme’s replacement of all the existing social security system may not just be difficult to 
implement. It would be expensive and could produce too many “losers”, especially among 
poorer households. Nevertheless, it could be a transitional “first step towards the 
implementation, over time, of a full or near-full scheme”.39    
A close cousin of UBI, but not qualifying as such due to features such as the infrequency of 
transfers, is the negative income tax (NIT). Under a NIT scheme, people with income at a 
prescribed level would be relieved of tax liability. That level would be sufficient in “welfare” 
terms to enable them to live without any additional State support. Those with earnings or 
income above that level would pay tax on it. Those with income below  it would receive support 
in the form of payments, either linked to the amount of that shortfall, or based on other criteria. 
Early advocates included Juliet Rhys-Williams who saw advantages in a “merger” of tax and 
social insurance schemes.40 Some commentators have their doubts about the value of tax-
based systems, including NIT-type schemes, or schemes like the USA’s Earned Income Tax 
Credit - particularly as an in-work source of support.41 Others see  a NIT as a potentially 
valuable option. Maximilian Sommer, for example, maintains that the conventional arguments 
against NIT, including a need for sizeable rises to tax rates, and negative impacts on labour 
supply and progression incentives, can be addressed successfully. It can also be designed to 
improve poverty reduction and  support for low-income households and larger families.42  
Previous adherents to a full BI model like Rutger Bregman have recently switched their 
allegiance to a minimum income guarantee that is, in effect, a NIT scheme.43    
Another variant of BI, but again not exactly fulfilling BI criteria with respect to aspects like 
conditionality, is the so called “participation income”. This looks to recipients to participate in 
the labour market or other  unpaid activity – caring roles, approved education, voluntary sector 
work, and other activity within a definition of “social contribution” – in return for support. An 
early advocate was the economist Tony Atkinson. Atkinson departed from mainstream 
arguments for a basic income in two respects. First, seeing it as an alternative to social 
insurance was a “mistake”. Rather, he considered it should be complementary to an improved 
insurance system, helping to reduce the need for means-tested benefits. Second, he argued 
that it would be “difficult to secure political support for a citizens income while it remains 
 
39  H. Reed and S. Lansley, Universal Basic Income: An idea whose time has come? (London: Compass, 2016), 8. 
40  J. Rhys-Williams, Taxation and Incentive (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953).  
41  For example, A. Alstott, “The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform”, Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. 108, 1995, 533; and “Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay”, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No.09-66, Law 
and Contemporary Problems, Vol.73, No.1, 2010. Much of the concern is with features like the EITC’s  propensity for inaccuracy, 
and unresponsiveness to people’s changing needs – particularly during periods of interrupted employment or income.   
42  M. Somer, A Feasible Basic Income Scheme for Germany (Springer, 2016), 7-49. 




unconditional on labour market or other activity”.44 There are obvious similarities between a 
participation income and systems like Brazil’s Bolsa Família. That system has many of the  
characteristics of a BI scheme, and in fact was the first step in a plan to roll-out a full national 
BI after the Brazilian Parliament’s enacted the enabling legislation.45   
Finally, there are issues around timing and implementation, giving rise to a variant of BI that 
may be termed a phased BI. Proponents like Malcolm Torry have put forward  such a phased 
introduction, developing support for one group at a time, such as pensioners, children, and 
young adults. In effect, it would start as a small-scale scheme, but increase in scope 
incrementally as current State benefits are progressively replaced.46  Interestingly, the Finnish 
BI experiment, discussed later in this paper, was preceded by an earlier project in 2014 as 
part of longer-term moves to align unemployment benefits more closely to a partial BI. It began 
with the removal of means-testing of part of the financial support given at that time to 
unemployed claimants. This enabled claimants to retain a modest proportion of their earnings 
(up to €300) without being disqualified from benefits. Amounts above that earned income 
threshold then started to be withdrawn at a 50% withdrawal rate.47  
 Such approaches have some similarities with the UK’s in-work Universal Credit, notably in 
the way the work allowances system enables a portion of earned income to be retained. If the 
claimant is entitled to a work allowance the earnings are compared to that  allowance. If they 
are less than the allowance they are disregarded in full as “income” in the UC means test. If 
the earnings exceed the work allowance, then a 63% taper is applied to the excess to produce 
the amount to be used in assessing payments. In most other respects UC falls well short of 
what could be seen as a Basic Income of the kind proposed by BIEN, not least because of the 
conditionality it  imposes, including features like employed recipients’ “progression” duty: ie 
the duty to continue seeking and taking up work opportunities until they reach their prescribed 
“conditionality earnings threshold”, normally 35 hours a week.48   
Before examining some of the pilots that have taken place, or which are proposed, it is worth 
looking more closely at the arguments for and against UBI.  
 
3. The Arguments for BI 
 
44 A. Atkinson, “The Case for a Participation Income”, The Political Quarterly (1996) Volume 67, Issue 1, 67-70: 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1467-923X.1996.tb01568.x 
45 It was signed into law by the President of Brazil in 2004 (Lei 10.835 de 8 Janeiro 2004). The Bolsa assists a sizeable proportion 
of Brazil’s families, delivering a highly conditioned, monthly income to households with a monthly income below a prescribed 
monthly amount. It is normally paid through a withdrawal card and is managed by a designated female head of the household, or 
other adult. Further information and eligibility criteria, conditions, etc is on Brazil’s social development and benefits site: 
http://mds.gov.br/assuntos/bolsa-familia It differs from comparable UK means-tested support like the Child Tax Credit in that 
receipt is conditional on requirements like children’s school attendance and vaccination. 
46  M. Torry, Money for Everyone: Why We Need A Citizen’s Basic Income (Bristol: Policy Press, 2013). 
47  A. Halmetoia, J. De Wispelaere, J. Perkiö, “A Policy Comet in Moominland? Basic Income in the Finnish Welfare State” (2019) 
Social Policy and Society, 18(2): 319-330, 327. Some BI proponents argue that a secure basic income means that unemployed 
workers who may otherwise be subject to conditionality, and be stymied by the requirement to be “unemployed”, would have 
greater options (and incentives) while they have a secure, unconditional income, including options like accepting part-time work 
or lower-paid employment, or taking up training opportunities;  P. Van Parijs and Y. Vanderborght, Basic Income: A Radical 
Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017), 49.  
48  On mandatory progression, see K. Puttick “From Mini to Maxi Jobs? Low Pay, ‘Progression’, and the Duty to Work (Harder)” 
(2019) Industrial Law Journal 48(2): 143-179, 172; and on wider issues affecting the inter-action of work and welfare, K. Puttick 




A variety of reasons, and potentially beneficial outcomes, for introducing a BI have been 
advanced. Perhaps the most wide-ranging have been provided by the Progressive Economy 
Forum (PEF) and a leading proponent, Guy Standing.49 The PEF regards the main 
justifications as rooted in social justice, the personal and community freedom that it could 
provide, and the “basic security” it would confer on recipients. Such security would be, in effect, 
a “public good” which would “strengthen social solidarity” and inform initiatives for sharing the 
benefits of national public wealth more widely. Social solidarity as an explicit rationale for a 
new welfare benefit would be a novelty in the UK unlike Continental systems like France’s 
where, for example, non-contributory support in the form of social assistance - paid for out of 
taxation - is part of “National Solidarity”.50  Beyond such justifications, the PEF case for a basic 
income – much of it mirrored in other proponents’ cases - develops Beveridge’s quest to slay 
the “five giants”51: but it argues that today there are eight further giants stalking the land: 
Inequality, Insecurity, Debt, Stress, Precarity, the Advancing Robots, and Extinction. Inequality 
is manifested in various ways, including the growth in wage differentials, wage stagnation, and 
the number of jobs paid at or below subsistence level. The PEF argue that a lone parent 
employed full-time on the minimum wage would be £70 short of the minimum income standard 
set by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Accordingly, they assert, a basic income of that 
amount would enable that parent to move out of poverty. The PEF’s ideas in this regard are 
also reflected in the proposals of leading commentators like Professor Anthony Atkinson, who 
put forward the case for participation income to complement existing social protection for such 
households, coupled with a universal child basic income. 52 
Alongside inequality is what the PEF terms the “giant of economic insecurity”, and in this 
regard it has branded the social security system itself - far from being a source of relief - as a 
“zone of insecurity”. Many of the specific forms of Insecurity that now affect citizens, including 
a fear of losing their employment or their home, also comes from Debt. As at mid-2018, 
household debt was reportedly higher than at any time on record; and much of it can be 
attributed to the inability of the social security system to meet claimants’ full costs in  areas   
like rent support.53 There are other aspects to debt linked to shortcomings in the social security 
system, however, which have fuelled the level of Want in recent years. A key factor has been 
the low level at which State benefits are paid: a recurring theme in reports by child poverty 
campaigners like the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) and the Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
A concern of the IFS since 2016 has been with the lack of growth in real incomes at the bottom 
of the income distribution, due in part to cuts in benefits levels and freezes in up-ratings. 
 
49  G. Standing, n.36 above, at 5-7, 11-38; and G. Standing Basic Income: And How We Can Make It Happen (London: Pelican 
Books, 2017). 
50  P. Martin, “Ideas, Controversies and Proposals about the Universal Basic Income in France”, (2007) 24 JSSL, Issue 1, 31-46. 
Social exclusion, and labour market integration, have also been important policy drivers  in the development of schemes like 
France’s Revenu de Solidarité Active; T. Vlandas, “The Politics of In-Work Benefits: The Case of the Active Income Solidarity’ in 
France”, (2012) French Politics, Vol 11, 117-142. 
51  Beveridge Report, n.13, at p.6: “Social insurance fully developed may provide income security; it is an attack upon Want. But 
Want is one only of five giants on the road of reconstruction and in some ways the easiest to attack. The others are Disease, 
Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness.” 
52  T. Atkinson, Inequality – What Can be Done? (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015), Proposal 13. For 
a more up-to-date commentary on the operation of the JRF minimum income standard, see D. Hirsch, A Minimum Income 
Standard for the UK in 2019 (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2019): https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/minimum-income-standard-
uk-2019  The JRF has also called for adequate uprating and restoration of the value of benefits, particularly for families with 
children; and for ensuring that the childcare costs paid with UC are based more closely on the price of childcare. 
53  The PEF refer to the four-year freeze on local housing allowances, as this affects the level at which Housing Benefit is paid, 
and the problems associated with rent arrears impacting on UC claimants; G. Standing, Basic Income as Common Dividends, 




Among other consequences this has meant that whilst there has been growth in average 
income across the population levels of absolute poverty have largely been unchanged.  
In addressing the issues around debt, the PEF assert that a basic income would not in itself 
eradicate debt, including debt levels induced by benefits freezes and rent arrears among UC 
claimants: but it would help by limiting what it calls “involuntary debt”, giving individuals and 
families “more financial control”. The issue of the viability (and sustainability) of a general basic 
income for all - paid unconditionally and without reference to a means-test - is revisited later. 
A key question is whether the level at which a BI would be set would be any significantly higher 
than the benefits it would replace, at least without significant rises in tax rates (and other 
contributing factors in net costs). 
The PEF report also refers to “millions of people living bits-and-pieces lives that go beyond 
issues of insecurity and stress. They feel that they are unable to develop themselves, have no 
occupational identity or narrative to give to their lives, and must do a lot of work that is not 
recognised or remunerated. They are the precariat”.54   
Suffice to say at the outset, however, that whilst it has many attractions, including the reduction 
in complexity, low take-up, and poverty traps associated with means-tested schemes, it is not 
immediately obvious how a one-size-fits-all Basic Income – at least in isolation, and without 
other welfare systems continuing to operate – could deliver the support required by the 
neediest groups in the community, and at the levels needed. Such groups currently benefit 
from a wide range of complex, expensive, and highly targeted systems and services. 
Consolidating that support into a universal, unconditional BI payment would be a considerable 
challenge. It would also pose significant risks for those in the bottom of the income distribution 
(including many of the low-paid workers in the bottom three wage deciles currently dependent 
on State in-work benefits, housing, council tax relief, and other support) if the cost of a basic 
income meant some of those sources being removed or reduced. There are, for example, 
sizeable groups like low-paid working parents with substantial childcare requirements, families 
and disabled people with additional and special needs, and those struggling with housing costs 
that could not be adequately met from such a “universal” BI payment unless it could be pitched 
at an adequate level to absorb such costs.  CPAG’s CEO, Alison Garnham, has argued 
convincingly that it is likely that there will always need to be a role for top-ups, needs-based 
additions, and means-testing unless it is possible to “revolutionise the generosity of other 
benefits”.55 However, she also makes it clear that it would be necessary to “consciously dump” 
 
54  G. Standing, Basic Income as Common Dividends, n.36 , 19. The  “precariatisation” theme is developed more fully in G. 
Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (London: Bloomsbury Revelations, 2016); and Basic Income and How We 
Can Make It Happen (London: Pelican/Penguin, 2017). Robert Castel, in a similar vein, wrote about the weakening of social 
organisation at the end of industrial capitalism and  “paths of disaffiliation”; R. Castel, La Montée des Incertitudes (Paris: Seuil, 
2009); and “The Rise of Uncertainties”, Critical Horizons Vol. 17, 2016, Issue 2, The Politics of Vulnerability, pp.160-167. As far 
as robotics and AI are concerned, the argument is not just about providing a cushion of income for those who are displaced from 
the labour market: it is framed more widely, in terms of putting in place “a distribution system that will ensure everybody in society 
shares in the economic gains from robots”. It would be a “form of preparatory insurance” (Basic Income as Common Dividends, 
n.36 , 21).  A trade union view recognises that a UBI might be a way of mitigating the social and economic downsides of 
technological change, but is considerably more sceptical about its ability to meet other challenges like growing inequality; A. 
Coote and E. Yazici, Universal Basic Income: A Union Perspective (London: New Economics Foundation/Public Services 
Institute, 2019), 20. 
55  Similar conclusions were reached by Compass after several simulations of how UBI systems would work in practice, and with 
comparisons between a “full” scheme and a “modified” scheme (in which an unconditional basic income were included, but with 
retention of some means-tested schemes); Reed and Lansley, n.39 above. It concluded that a full scheme would not just be too 
expensive, it would produce too many losers among poorer households. As considered later, the outcomes from a modified 




the negative history of stigma and focus full-square on take-up if means-testing is to become 
“functional and acceptable”.56  
Both Garnham and another CPAG commentator, Lizzie Flew, have observed that additional 
top-ups would be needed to prevent people on low incomes becoming worse-off under a BI 
scheme. Besides support from some benefits that could be “truly universal”, such as Child 
Benefit for families with children, there is much still to be learnt from what she describes as 
the “light touch targeting approach of tax credits”, helped by  longer awards that could offer 
more certainty of income, but with less regular means-testing.57 
Like the PEF, the Royal Society of Arts (RSA) has been making the case forcefully for a Basic 
Income since at least 2015, directing much of its attack on the failings of the social security 
system. It has contended that “It has become increasingly clear that we are facing significant 
social change as we age as a society, technology impacts our economy and social life, and our 
welfare state is no longer fit-for-purpose”, describing it as “increasingly complex, bureaucratic, 
and intrusive”, and reinforced in recent years by a “coercive and arbitrary sanctioning system 
which leaves many of the least fortunate in dire straits”.58 Such views about the increasing 
conditionality and sanctioning in the system are undoubtedly shared by many academics and 
practitioners.59 However, it also frames its case for a BI on wider considerations like the 
expected impact of artificial intelligence and technological change, and consequent need to 
address issues of growing underemployment and the need for financial support for those 
needing to transition to different careers. It also sees an ageing society as a growing challenge, 
with a need to expand the caring economy without the current barriers to this (“A Basic Income 
would help people care for their relatives, friends and neighbours without having to account for 
their actions to the State”).60 In common with other BI proponents, both the RSA and PEF 
highlight transformations in the labour market, the increasingly precarious nature of much of 
the work that is available, the threats posed by artificial intelligence to employment, and the 
inability of the social security system to cope with these, as grounds for introducing a UBI. The 
RSA has emphasised the important role that BI payments could play in supporting people 
during periods of retraining, entrepreneurship, lower hours and periods of unemployment, 
dictating a need for a welfare system that is supportive of mobility across the life cycle.61 
 
56  A. Garnham, The Problem with Means-Testing (London: CPAG, Nov 2019). She also notes how treating people with dignity 
and respect, and adopting a governmental commitment to maximising family incomes, as Scotland has done in its legislation, 
might go a long way towards achieving this; ibid, p.5. The legislation in question is the Social Security (Scotland) Act 2018. S.1 
sets out the principles, including s.1(d) which stipulates that “respect for the dignity of individuals is to be at the heart of the 
Scottish social security system”. S.3 establishes a duty on ministers to promote take-up: specifically, they must “keep under 
consideration what steps they could take to ensure that individuals are given what they are eligible to be given through the 
Scottish social security system”. 
57  L. Flew, “Why Give Money to People ‘Who Don’t Need It’? The Case Against Intensive Means-Testing” (London: CPAG, Nov. 
2019). 
58  Painter and Thoung, n.34 above, at p.4. 
59   See Dwyer, n.4 above. Much of the opposition of unions and the Left to UC has been directed at extensions to conditionality 
like “mandatory progression” and the “minimum income floor”; “UC is causing a hostile environment for thousands of families”, 
Unite the Union Day of Action 23rd May 2018; and Puttick, Disintegration or Renewal?, n.48, pp.66-68. 
60  Painter and Thoung, n.34 above, at p.5. 
61  Painter and Thoung, n.34, p.9. Opportunities for such mid-career re-training and personal development would be enhanced 
by the proposed £5000 “opportunity dividend” from the RSA’s proposed Universal Basic Opportunity Fund; see Universal Basic 
Income Fund: A Step Towards Universal Basic Income (London: RSA, 2018). Something similar, a £10,000 grant (or “skills 




Finally, in this section, it may be observed that in some sections of the trade union movement 
BI is seen as a potentially valuable means of strengthening workers’ bargaining power so that 
they can improve or safeguard pay and conditions, resist redundancies and other changes 
that would make them worse off and less secure - essentially by making it easier to take 
industrial action and use their basic income to fall back on. There is certainly some attraction 
in this. In the UK context it would compare favourably with the current position with UC 
whereby strikers, having withdrawn their labour in furtherance of a trade dispute, are to be 
“assumed to have employed earnings at the same level they would have had were it not for 
the trade dispute.'62   
However, other commentators, unions, and union federations like Public Services 
International disagree and have serious doubts about the BI project. 63  
In the next section consideration is given to some of the main concerns. 
 
4. Concerns with BI Schemes 
High on the list is the cost of universality, and the consequent challenges associated with 
coverage and “reach”. The focus here is particularly on “full” models. The counter-narrative is 
that if BI is to maintain current levels of support, extend assistance to those harder-to-reach 
groups who currently fall through the system’s safety-nets64, and extend it to others (including 
others further up the income distribution) – doing this in ways that are free from the problems 
associated with means-testing, conditionality, and complex barriers - then BI must be delivered 
on a universal basis. However, the higher the universality, the higher the cost. That cost could 
be met, but it would necessitate raising tax rates, introducing new taxes (particularly on 
wealth), or initiating new approaches like the establishment of sovereign wealth funds. The 
scope for this, and for a new “investment state” is considered later. Otherwise, the discussion 
inevitably switches to ways of containing costs. The first option is to simply reduce the amount 
of BI payments but, in doing so, risking that the scheme fails to deliver the support at the level 
required. Second, BI payments can be more closely targeted or “conditioned”, in which case 
the scheme starts to lose its “universal” credentials - at least pending any further steps to 
progress towards a fully universal, unconditional scheme.65 Third, containment could be 
achieved by limiting the reach of the BI programmes and maintaining other more targeted and 
means-tested benefits. This has been the approach taken with the RSA’s basic income model 
since it was first put forward.66 Unsurprisingly, the “simplicity” and reduced costs assumed to 
 
62  Universal Credit Regulations 2013, reg. 56. The practical impact is to ascribe a fictitiously high level of earned income in the 
UC re-assessment. Normally when earnings or other income go down, UC is re-calculated, and it goes up to reflect the claimant’s 
and dependants’ increased needs. This delivers a double impact: first from the employer, second from the State.  
63  A. Coote and E. Yazici, Universal Basic Income: A Union Perspective (New Economics Foundation/Public Services 
International, 2019).  It concluded there is no evidence that UBI could increase the bargaining power of workers and unions, and 
no evidence that it could be “affordable, inclusive, sufficient, and sustainable at the same time” (p.13); and see A. Coote, 
“Universal basic income doesn’t work. Let’s boost the public realm instead”, The Guardian, 6th May 2019.  
64  Workers in atypical employment are a case in point; see M. Westerveld and M. Olivier (eds) Social Security Outside the Realm 
of the Employment Contract: Informal Work and Employee-Like Workers (Cheltenham and Northampton, USA, Edward Elgar, 
2019). 
65  This is essentially what appears to have happened with Brazil’s Bolsa Familia. The legislative framework, and enabling powers, 
are still in place, as previously discussed (n.45). Options for conditioning BI payments have been supported by some 
commentators; see, for example, D. Susskind, A World Without Work (London: Allen Lane, 2020). 
66  “A progressive basic income must run alongside other targeted benefits and complement the essential role that the state plays 




accompany the introduction of universal BI systems is frequently invoked in support of BI 
systems, and when comparisons are made with the level of bureaucracy, adjudication 
arrangements, etc required for mainstream social security systems. However, the scale of 
savings, and claims made about this, have been questioned.67   
Estimates of what a full BI would cost vary considerably. There are various microsimulation 
studies which have assessed the fiscal and distributional aspects of both full and partial 
schemes factoring in replacement of existing social security programmes. Luke Martinelli 
examined full and partial coverage schemes, in the case of full schemes modelling four levels 
of “generosity”.68 When examining partial coverage schemes, the analysis also modelled how 
expansion of coverage could be sequenced so that the fiscal burden of the changes could be 
reduced or extended over a protracted period. The revenue-neutral schemes assumed that 
any increases in expenditure had to be matched by a corresponding rise in tax revenue. 
Essentially, for a basic income in line with current benefits, after eliminating the personal 
income tax allowance and NI lower and upper thresholds, the income tax rate would have to 
rise by 4%. Any additional amounts needed, for example to provide premiums for people with 
disability needs, would require a tax rise closer to 8%. Despite positive features, much of the 
challenge highlighted the difficulties of designing “fiscally feasible” BI schemes that can avoid 
negative distributional consequences and be sufficiently generous to obviate a continued 
reliance on means-testing.69 Achieving this, according to Martinelli, involves a “series of trade-
offs” between the goals of meeting need, controlling the cost of schemes, and eliminating 
means-testing. The “unavoidable reality” is that schemes either produce unacceptable 
distributional consequences for some groups or their overall cost is simply too high. Retention 
of the existing means-tested benefits structure would produce a better compromise between 
meeting need and controlling cost: but at a price, namely maintaining administrative 
complexity and some negative work incentive effects.  
 
Similar conclusions emerge from simulations carried out on behalf of Compass using the 
Landman Economics tax-benefit model. These also examined the cost and distributional 
outcomes of full and partial BI schemes.70 There were five simulations: three variants of a “full” 
scheme that replaced most means-tested benefits, and two variants of a “modified” scheme 
which left some existing means-tested benefits in place (but which could operate as a first 
step towards implementation of a full or near-full scheme).  
 
 
size-fits-all UBI would either need to be pitched very high on the “generosity” index, in which case the cost would rise significantly, 
or else other more targeted schemes would have to operate in tandem (Reed and Lansley, n.39 above, p.12). Inclusion of 
elements in a comprehensive UBI replacing schemes dealing with costs like housing, and the transfer of responsibility for making 
payments out of it to recipients, raises the spectre of some recipients’ facing difficulties in managing their finances: a problem 
which UC encountered when HB direct payments to landlords were ended. 
 
67  J. De Wispelaere and L. Stirton “The Administrative Efficiency of Basic Income”, (2011) Policy and Politics 39(1) January: 115-
132 (considering “unwarranted generalisations or careless assumptions” that permeate the discussion of the administrative 
properties of basic income); and “The Politics of Unconditional Basic Income: Bringing Bureaucracy Back In”, Political Studies 
(2013) Volume 61, Issue 4: 915-932 (challenging the view of UBI advocates that its administration is uncontroversial, and 
identifying essential tasks that any income maintenance policy must achieve, namely defining eligibility criteria, determining who 
satisfies it, and disbursing payments). 
68  L. Martinelli, The Fiscal and Distributional Implications of Alternative Universal Basic Income Schemes in the UK (2017, Institute 
for Policy Research, Bath University).  
69  Ibid, p.6. 




In each case, the schemes were evaluated by reference to their net cost (equal to the net cost 
of the BI payments: ie net of savings from the abolition of, or reduced reliance on, some 
means-tested benefits, and net of the revenue-raising changes to income tax, NI contributions, 
or both); the number and pattern of gainers and losers;  the distributional effects (by household 
income decile and benefit unit type); the impact on poverty for different groups (children, 
working age adults, pensioners); and the impact on inequality (measured by the Gini 
coefficient as the internationally recognized measure of inequality). The results were 
compared with the tax and benefit system applying in 2015/16. Predictably, each scheme 
produced a different pattern of winners and losers and different overall net costs. Whilst it was 
recognised that schemes tested would allow savings in administrative costs – significantly for 
full schemes, less so for ‘modified schemes’ - these were not included in the calculation of net 
costs. 
 
Reference should be made to the detailed results for the three “full” schemes71, but in summary 
these show that while it is possible to design a full scheme which is “progressive” - ie with 
poorer households gaining on average, and richer households losing – there are some 
significant downsides and concerns. Despite some achievable gains – mostly further up the 
income distribution - there would be a “large number of losers” at the lower end of the 
distribution. That was the case for all three “full” schemes. A full BI also pointed to sharp rises 
in relative child poverty in all the schemes considered. Even after rises in the basic rate of tax 
there would still be significant net costs. For these reasons it was concluded that full schemes 
of the kind examined would not be feasible, at least without a sovereign wealth fund. A 
modified scheme was more viable, ie one paying a lower level of BI whilst retaining some 
current means-tested benefits system (but with some reduction in households’ dependence 
on means testing by taking into account their citizen’s payment when calculating their 
benefits). There were some important points to emerge from the analysis of the two modified 
schemes.  Although Scheme 2 paid slightly higher weekly payments, for example £71 a week 
for adults aged over 25 instead of £61 in Scheme 2, the income tax rates needed to support 
this difference rose sharply (up 2 per cent for all bands).  Besides the higher tax rates – 25 
per cent basic, 45 per cent higher, 50 per cent top – other cost factors generated some 
significantly different net costs: £8.2 billion a year for Scheme 2 as against £0.7 billion for 
Scheme 1.72 
 
Commentators like Donald Hirsch73 accept that a BI (or citizen’s income) could deal with the 
disadvantages of a more means-tested system, particularly its complexity and the rapid 
withdrawal of benefits as earnings rise (which can, in turn, add to work disincentives). 
However, a transition to an effective BI system would require major changes (“seismic shifts”) 
in attitudes and policy on at least three fronts: acceptance that everybody should be supported 
at a certain level and with no work conditions; acceptance of a greater role for the State in 
redistribution, with substantially higher rates of direct taxation (potentially 40 per cent on all 
income, and at least 50 per cent if means-tested housing support were to be abolished), or 
else some equivalent means of raising much more money than is currently raised through tax; 
 
71  Appendix B, ibid pp.27-30. 
72  Ibid, p.15 Table 1 Benefit Levels, Benefits and Tax Rates for the Two Modified UBI Schemes. The latter, particularly Scheme 
2, had attractions over full BIs like “progressive” gains in the bottom 3 income deciles, and child poverty reductions (pp.16-18). 




and a reduced role of the State in ensuring that each citizen can afford particular essentials, 
notably housing and childcare, after a citizen’s income replaced current schemes.  
 
Hirsch’s third point puts into stark relief some of the wider concerns of other commentators 
about BI, including those who see dangers in simply consolidating (or purporting to 
consolidate) existing provision into a flat-rate BI payment, making the payment to individuals, 
and then effectively walking away from further involvement after existing provision is wound 
up. He also has concerns about the alternative route to a full BI, namely through the 
introduction of a ‘partial’ BI – particularly in terms of complexity.74    
 
Some significant concerns on aspects of BI have also been expressed by the International 
Labour Organisation. In 2018 the ILO published a commentary75 having regard to current 
principles on what constitutes an effective social protection floor one.76 Most of the focus has 
been on ensuring that support under BI schemes can meet the criteria of “adequacy and 
predictability”. In terms of the ILO’s social inclusion and Decent Work agendas, it is also keen 
to highlight the importance of a scheme’s “reach”, for example by extending to groups like 
workers in the informal economy and their families and dependants, and those  who are  
disabled or have long-term incapacities. The ILO’s worst fear, and this comes through strongly 
in its guidance, appears to be with “neo-liberal or libertarian UBI proposals replacing the 
welfare state with a minimalistic safety net”, and with budget-neutral schemes that only 
manage to produce a low-level safety net, especially if it means eliminating existing social 
security provision. That is also a very real concern among unions and some sections of the 
Left, who see BI schemes, and the consolidation of current programmes into schemes 
delivering little more than small payments to individuals, as a wholly insufficient means of 
building economic self-sufficiency. Worse, as suggested in Universal Basic Income: A Union 
Perspective, they could be used to justify rolling back the social state and dismantling public 
services, whilst doing little to address the impact of rapidly changing labour markets, 
inadequate welfare systems, inequality, and powerlessness.77    
These are pertinent issues in all systems, but particularly in the UK  given the impact of 
austerity on levels of provision, freezes to benefits up-ratings, and cuts to social services. As 
a general point, it is not unreasonable to ask, as some commentators have done, whether any 
social security system could truly be effective when funding levels for social security 
 
74  Ibid, pp.3, 21-24: “A risk here is that a citizen’s income contributing to, but not fully replacing, current levels of means-tested 
support could make the current system even more complex, if a means-tested top-up of the citizen’s income was needed. It could 
also potentially lead to a reduction in basic entitlements, if such top-ups were abolished or allowed to wither.” 
 
75  I. Cortiz et al, Universal Basic Income proposals in light of ILO standards: key issues and global costing, Extension of Social 
Security Working Paper ESS 62 (Geneva: Social Protection Department, ILO, August 2018). 
 
76  Social Protection Floors Recommendation 2002 (No. 202) (Geneva: ILO, 2002). The ILO’s provisions go into considerable 
detail. This highlights one of the problems with some BI schemes, namely  their lack of specificity, for example in explaining  how, 
exactly, they  will support “disadvantaged groups and people with special needs” (art. 16) or, more generally, deliver  the “range 
and level of benefits set out in the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 1952 (No. 102)”, and meet the standards set 
in other ILO social security Conventions and Recommendations (art.17).  
77  Coote and Yazici, n.62 above, pp.9-13. The report was produced by the New Economics Foundation for Public Services 
International, a global union federation representing 20 million workers in public services in 154 countries, and it was funded by 





programmes in the UK are at an all-time low.78 Going forward, there is evidence of some 
relaxation of austerity as it has impacted on social security, including a partial un-freezing of 
benefits up-ratings sinceApril 2020. More generally, the government has signalled modest 
changes, for example raising the threshold at which low earners start to pay National 
Insurance contributions as part of a wider ranging “simplification” of the tax and NI systems 
designed to reduce the perceived burden of taxes. However, such initiatives, according to the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, will predominantly help those in higher-income households.79 In 
the longer term,  there has been little evidence  of any serious move to address what looks 
like a gathering perfect storm in funding social security. According to the Resolution 
Foundation, in order just to maintain current levels of State welfare schemes,  spending will 
need to rise as a share of GDP  by 7 per cent before 2066. Without taking action  debt would 
rise to 230 per cent of GDP; and meeting that cost would be equivalent to raising total tax 
revenues  by £160 billion a year. This is possible and not as unthinkable as it might seem at 
first glance. In fact, it would align the UK’s spending with spending in another major European 
social state, Germany. Nevertheless, it would be a “huge shift”, and if done through higher 
income and consumption taxes it would also be a “big drag” on living standards.80   
Several of the main models for a full basic BI scheme exclude support like housing costs and 
disability payments, or else proponents are still developing viable solutions. The RSA originally 
proposed a “Basic Rental Income” for those renting a property, and in the event of any 
“shortfall” in the necessary funding it proposed a land value tax.81 It is not entirely clear, though, 
how such a source of revenue could even begin to  match current Housing Benefit costs, or 
respond to likely rises in such costs in a rental market that has remained largely unregulated 
since the removal of rent controls by the Housing Act 1980. One analyst, Jonathan Portes, 
sees support for housing costs, along with disability and incapacity-related benefits, as the 
“two most expensive and problematic aspects of the current UK welfare system”, neither of 
which are directly addressed in BI models. He argues that while basic income eliminates work-
related conditionality it is, by definition, impossible to have a system of disability-related 
benefits that does not also have some form of test to determine claimants’ disability status. 
He goes on to suggest that current proposals for a UK citizen’s income avoid the issue by 
preserving, broadly, the current system. This, however, would mean sacrificing much of the 
hoped-for gains from “simplification”.82  Similar concerns have been expressed by the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. They see difficulty in including a “simple rent element” within a BI 
payment, at least “without creating shortfalls for some or large surpluses for others” (with the 
same problem applying with means-tested childcare support).83   
 
78  C. McNeil et al, Social (in)security: Reforming the UK’s social safety-net , (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2019) 
at p.2. As the authors  observe, with schemes like UC “For too many, it is a tightrope over poverty, not a social safety net”.  
 
79  X. Xu and R. Joyce, “Options for cutting direct personal taxes and supporting low earners”, IFS Green Budget (London: IFS, 
October 2019). Another finding is that whilst raising NIC thresholds would help low and middle earners,  assistance for low earners 
would be achieved more effectively by increasing the work allowances in Universal Credit. An interesting proposal, from the New 
Economics Foundation, is to scrap the personal tax allowance and pay £48 to all those earning below £125,000 a year; A. Sterling, 
“Why everyone earning less than £125,000 should be given £48 per week” (iNews, 11th March 2019). 
80  T. Bell, “To maintain our welfare state we need to rethink how we pay for it” (London: Resolution Foundation, 2018). 
 
81  Painter and Thoung, Creative Citizen, Creative State, n.34 above, at p.34.  
82  J. Portes, “Universal Basic Services Discussion Paper” in J. Portes, H. Reed, A. Percy (eds) Social Prosperity for the Future:  
A Proposal for Universal Basic Services (London: UCL, Institute for Global Prosperity), p.21.  
83  C. Goulden, “Universal Basic Income – not the answer to poverty” (York: JRF, 2018). The argument is, essentially, that the 
current system is designed to provide specific payments for people in specific circumstances, including potentially high housing 





The question as to what to do about the problem of how housing costs support from the State 
would operate in support of BI is an important one – particularly given the way rental costs in 
an unregulated rented housing market have risen, and given the sizeable amounts people are 
having to pay as a proportion of their earnings.84 There is also the challenge of regional 
disparities in rent levels, making it difficult to develop anything like a national BI scheme 
capable of incorporating such costs, and displacing local HB regimes that factor in prevailing 
rent levels (through the Local Housing Allowance system).  
 
One of the “unknown” impacts from the introduction of a BI scheme relates to work incentives 
and disincentives. Again, there are differing views. On the one hand, critics have a concern 
that an untargeted BI would add to an already problematic narrative about a “something for 
nothing” culture, with a degree of risk that this could reduce work incentives. Others see the 
issue very differently, with a secure payment encouraging entry to paid employment (and 
progression), particularly if its design and operation can reduce the disincentive from paying 
more tax, seeing State benefits withdrawn as working hours and earnings rise, and incurring 
more work-related costs (travel, childcare, etc). In other words, the classic “poverty trap”. 
Furthermore, it could offer people more freedom and choice about the organisation of their 
lives..85 As with other aspects of BI, the impact on work incentives is still largely unknown and 
untested.  
 
With that in mind, the role of trials and pilots in evaluating design and operational issues like 
work incentives, cost, and administration, is considered in the next section.    
 
5. Recent and Planned Pilots 
Trials of income transfer schemes in different forms, with differing degrees of universality and 
conditionality, and funded from a range of sources, have been conducted in countries with 
both developing and developed social security systems. Although there are some important 
lessons that can be learnt from these, there have been no opportunities, to date, to evaluate 
schemes that are up and running and which have all the characteristics of a fully universal and 
unconditional BI scheme. There are various schemes that pay a universal income or dividend 
from schemes funded entirely or in part from centrally managed sovereign wealth funds. These 
 
those specific needs “at huge cost”, or there is an income fall for those with them. BI proponents are aware of the problem, and 
it is work-in-progress.   
 
84  The scale of the problem was highlighted in a 2018 JRF analysis of rents. In half of English districts rent levels were shown to 
be more than a third of full-time local pay when the least expensive quarter of private rents was compared to the earnings of the 
lowest paid quarter of employees. Using the same rent-wages comparison, rent was more than half of local full-time pay in parts 
of Greater London and the South-East.  In parts of Greater Manchester and North Yorkshire  rent levels exceed a third of full-
time pay; Housing Costs and Poverty: Private Rents Compared to Local Earnings (York: J Rowntree Foundation, Analysis Unit, 
2018). A UBI, however generous, would not deal with other underlying causes of the housing crisis such as low pay, a lack of 
affordable housing, and long-term policy failures; Puttick, Disintegration or Renewal?, n.48, 64-66. 
 
85  See, for example, Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy, 
n.47 above. The issues are complex but neatly summarised in the Compass study; Reed and Lansley, n.39 at pp.12,14: “Would 
a UBI help to create a ‘money-for-nothing’ culture, with some of the workforce opting either out of work or to work less?” before 
observing that evidence from UBI experiments suggests that the number dropping out from of the labour force is “likely to be 
small” and that there could be “knock-on benefits” (Reed and Lansley, n.39, at pp.12, 13). Results from the Finland study are 




include an Iranian scheme funded from oil revenues86, and the Alaskan Permanent Fund 
which makes income transfers in the form of dividend for Alaskan residents who are settled in 
the state.87 Brazil is a country which has come close to implementing a basic BI scheme. 
Enabling legislation to facilitate this was, in fact, passed by the country’s legislature. However, 
as considered earlier in this paper, the system is still at an early stage of evolution, which 
means it remains highly conditioned, targeted on households rather than individuals, and 
means-tested by reference to those households’ monthly income.88  Like Brazil, South Africa 
has an evolving floor of social protection, including a “basic income grant” which, in 
combination with other targeted schemes like child support grant and an old age grant, delivers 
a developing “social wage packet”. As well as securing impressive levels of coverage, 
entitlements are delivered within a “constitutional framework” designed to secure such rights.89 
Proposals for a universal basic income grant were made in 2002. However, in the absence of 
the necessary capacity and institutional arrangements, an alternative strategy was adopted. 
This favoured  gradual development of a comprehensive and integrated income support 
scheme to underpin the country’s social protection system.90  
Otherwise, there have been assorted smaller-scale schemes, including those funded with the 
help of international development support rather than through domestic funding sources. As 
proponents of a planned pilot in Sheffield have said, while there have been some trials of BI-
type schemes elsewhere in the world most evidence has come from times and contexts which 
are very different from the UK.91 Furthermore, account must be taken of some significant 
differences in the experiences of tax-funded welfare states and social contribution-funded 
ones. The Sheffield project plans to  provide what looks like a particularly valuable study, 
exploring the practicalities and administration of universal BI options, their effects on 
participants, and wider impacts on the community.92   
Recent developments in the trialling of UBI systems like the Finnish experiment have offered 
useful initial data on aspects like work motivation, health and well-being, and recipients’ 
perceptions of the system (for example when compared with their experience with existing 
social security schemes).93 As the introduction to the government’s preliminary result report 
 
86  T. Hamid, “The Basic Income Road to Reforming Iran's Price Subsidies," Basic Income Studies, 2011 Vol. 6(1), October, 1-
24. Essentially, direct transfers to citizens replaced an earlier system of State food, fuel, and heating subsidies. 
87   Alaska is one of about fifty countries which have sovereign wealth funds, not all of them paying dividends or other benefits, 
and operating in ways that have considerable potential to help fund BI-type schemes; A. Cummine, “Overcoming Dividend 
Skepticism: Why the World’s Sovereign Wealth Funds Are Not Paying Basic Income Dividends” (2011) Basic Income Studies, 
Vol, 6 Issue 1, 1-17. The UK is a wealthy country, and this and the Iranian scheme certainly offer models for a possible UK fund. 
88  Information on the Programa Bolsa Família, eligibility criteria, conditionality, etc is on Brazil’s social development and benefits 
site: http://mds.gov.br/assuntos/bolsa-familia 
89  J. Hagen-Zanker and J. Morgan (with C. Meth), South Africa’s Cash Social Security Grants: Progress in Increasing Coverage 
(London: Overseas Development Institute, 2011); and K. Puttick, “The Challenges for Labour Law and Social Security Systems 
at the Labour-Social Security Interface” ch.9 in R. Blanpain, F. Hendrickx, D. Du Toit (eds), Labour Law and Social Progress: 
Holding the Line or Shifting the Boundaries?  Netherlands: Kluwer Law International BV,  159-189 (paper at the ISLSSL XXI 
World Congress of Labour Law and Social Security, Capetown, South Africa, September 2015). 
90  Transforming the Present - Protecting the Future: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social 
Security for South Africa (Chair, Prof. Viviene Taylor) - A Report for the Ministry of Social Development, 2002, chapter 5, p.63. 
91  M. Bryan and J. Leman (with H. Rice and S. Duffy), Working Paper: Proposal for a Sheffield Pilot (Sheffield: UBI LAB, 2019). 
92  More specifically, it would  involve pilots for three main options: a Tweak (taking conditionality out of illness and disability 
benefits); a Top-Up (delivering a non-means-tested benefit to all); and a Replacement (with a full replacement of tax and benefits); 
ibid, p.2. 
 
93 On the experiment’s design and objectives, implementation, and preliminary results, see L Kaliomaa-Puha, A. Tuovinen, O. 




stated, the project’s aim was to find out whether the introduction of a basic income could make 
the social security system in Finland “more inclusive and further increase the labour supply”. 
The project was a nation-wide two-year randomised controlled trial. The test (or “treatment”) 
group comprised 2000 unemployed recipients aged 25-58 who had been receiving basic 
unemployment benefits and in-work support benefits. Another, larger group acted as the 
control group. Those in the test group received a monthly unconditional basic income of 560 
Euros instead of conditional basic unemployment benefits, and this could be received on top 
of earnings, housing allowances, and other social assistance.  
There were some complications that reportedly impacted on the study. These included 
differences in the tax treatment of the two groups, and  the exclusion of the value of the BI 
amount from taxation. Political considerations played a key role in framing the study’s remit, 
including a strong focus on the labour market effects of a BI.94 There were also some concerns 
that rather than being seen as a tool operating in opposition to labour market activation, the 
project scheme could be perceived as a way of promoting it  (and labour market integration) 
when advocates of a pilot wanted significantly more than that. Surprisingly, as some observers 
commented, the government did not see the contradiction in simultaneously conducting the 
study and rolling out an unconditional basic income experiment, together with a new sanctions 
regime for unemployment benefits claimants.95 Despite such issues, preliminary results 
pointed to some positive preliminary findings.96 For example, on work activity, there were no 
statistically significant differences between the groups. On wellbeing, BI recipients fared 
considerably better in terms of maintaining  health and managing stress, and in their  
confidence about employment. Those managing the research emphasised, however, that the 
results were only “preliminary”. Therefore it  is not  possible to draw any firm conclusions until 
all the data for the evaluation study – register data, surveys, interviews, etc – has been 
considered (expected later in 2020).  
As well as providing a valuable commentary on previous research, and work done in Finland, 
Ontario, Canada, and the Netherlands, and consultations at recent Basic Income Earth 
Network 2018 conferences, the  Scottish Basic Income Steering Group has described work 
being done in preparation for a pilot to evaluate a Citizen’s Basic Income (CBI) for Scotland. 
This is being pioneered by four Scottish councils working in collaboration with the National 
Health Service  and  Improvement Service, supported by the Carnegie Trust.97 The project 
team has reported on their  feasibility work in an interim report.98 This was assisted by a study 
by CPAG Scotland on the inter-action of a piloted CBI with current benefits.99 The Group put 
 
“The Rise (and Fall) of the Basic Income Experiment in Finland”, CESofa Forum 3/2018 September, Volume 19, pp.15-19; O. 
Kangas and V. Pulkka, “From Idea to Experiment. Report on Basic Income Experiment in Finland” Working Paper Kela/106 
(Helsinki, Prime Minister’s Office, 2016); A. Halmetoia, J. De Wispelaere, J. Perkiö, “A Policy Comet in Moominland? Basic 
Income in the Finnish Welfare State” (2019) Social Policy and Society, 18(2): 319-330, 327. O. Kangas, S. Jauhiainen, M. 
Simanainen, M. Ylikännö, The Basic Income Experiment 2017–2018 in Finland, 2019: Preliminary Results (providing a 
preliminary register-based statistical analysis of the employment effects of the 2017 experiment, and an analysis based on survey 
data which examines the impact of the experiment on the wellbeing of the basic income recipients): 
http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/161361.   
94  De Wispelaere, Halmetoja, and Pulkka, n.93 above, at p.16.  
95  Ibid, at p.17.  
96  Kangas, Jauhiainen, Simanainen, and Ylikännö, n.93  above. 
97  Scottish Basic Income Steering Group, Exploring the Practicalities of a Basic Income Pilot (Carnegie UK Trust, 2019), p.9: 
https://www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk/publications/exploring-the-practicalities-of-a-basic-income-pilot/   
98  Assessing the Feasibility of Citizen’s Basic Income Pilots in Scotland:  An Interim Report (October 2019).  
99  Exploring the Implications of a Citizen’s Basic Income Pilot, Child Poverty Action Group Scotland (March, 2019). CPAG 
identified important challenges, for example: “To ensure a pilot CBI left participants overall with no less support than they would 
get from existing social security benefits would mean considering how to provide for variable costs, in particular housing, childcare 
and disability-related costs.” It added that “Because of the wide variation in costs, it is difficult to identify a level of CBI that would 




forward two main options for testing. Both are universal and unconditional. A “high level” 
payment, based on the Minimum Income Standard produced by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, which it believes is “likely to be able to substantially reduce or eradicate poverty”: 
the amounts are £120.48, £213.59 and £195.90 per week for people aged 0-15 years, 16 
years to pension age, and pension age respectively; and a second, lower, level of payment 
more closely aligned with current benefit entitlements: £84.54, £57.90, £73.10 and £167.25 
for those aged 0-19 years, 20-24 years, 25 years to pension age, and pension age 
respectively.100 Assurances were given, following publication of the interim report, that neither 
option would be tested in ways that could lead to detriment s for participants in the pilots.101 
After a final report in 2020 there will  be a decision as to whether the Scottish Government will 
support the project’s progression. If it does so, , the next phase is expected to take the form 
of a two or three-year pilot to inform policy and recommendations on a Scottish CBI.  
The Scottish and Sheffield trials will be of great interest in other parts of the UK and overseas. 
6. Conclusions 
As this paper has considered, there are undoubted attractions in the idea of a universal BI – 
particularly a scheme which can deliver improved levels of support and other positive 
outcomes, and without the many negative features that accompany current programmes.  
Unfortunately, as has been seen since the roll-out of Universal Credit, phrases like 
“simplification” do not enjoy the currency they once had. Nevertheless, there is clear  merit in 
any system which can operate with less complexity, adjudication, and administration.102  There 
is also considerable attraction in the prospect of losing  much of the conditionality and 
sanctioning  that accompanies means-testing,  even if there would need to be some residual 
conditionality linked to adjudications, for example in  processes to determine disability status 
when establishing eligibility for support.103   
Studies of the costs and on-costs of transitioning to a “full” variant of a universal BI, or doing 
so right away, suggest that these  may simply be too high, at least using current funding 
mechanisms and without resort to newer sources like a securely funded, sustainable 
sovereign wealth fund. The alternative is to sacrifice existing levels of provision. That still 
leaves options open for “partial” BI schemes, and phasing-in routes to an eventual full BI. In 
terms of process, policy development and implementation would need to be preceded by 
significant public engagement (and support) as planning for the Scottish pilots sensibly 
recognises. Addressing the risk of producing negative distributional outcomes for sizeable 
groups which currently receive targeted support from non-contributory/universal schemes – 
particularly housing costs paid under Housing Benefit and UC, disability schemes, and 
 
replace all means-tested benefits with a CBI would either involve paying a high level of CBI to all or leaving some significantly 
worse off, principally those on the lowest incomes and with the greatest needs. Even if a level were to be found that left no-one 
worse off in cash terms that could nonetheless leave some groups worse off relative to others.” (at p.4). 
100 Interim Report, pp.5, 23-29.  
101 “The group do not want to propose models of CBI for piloting that will lead to direct financial detriment for participants. The 
challenge is that the current social security system is designed to identify financial need and pay people accordingly, while a CBI 
is designed to be universal. To achieve a balance, certain benefits would need to be continued alongside a CBI” (Partners involved 
in exploring the feasibility of citizens basic income (CBI) pilots in Scotland have published an interim report into their findings, 
Basic Income Scotland, 4th November 2019).  
102  Even if this could not be eliminated altogether; De Wispelaere and L. Stirton, n.67  above.  




childcare assistance – remains a huge challenge. As seen at different points in the roll-out of 
UC, there would be a serious political cost for getting this wrong.   
As highlighted by Martinelli’s work, the challenges also relate to the difficulty of overcoming 
trade-offs, primarily between the goals of meeting need, controlling costs, and eliminating 
means-testing (discussed in the Concerns with BI Schemes section). A slightly different take 
on this, but to similar effect, has been provided by Jonathan Portes of UCL’s Institute for Global 
Prosperity, observing that whilst BI can deal with aspects like  work incentives it cannot get 
over such trade-offs, as they are “inherent” in tax and benefit systems.104 There is considerable 
uncertainty about how such issues could be dealt with  given how the challenges will  vary 
between different types of scheme, claimant groups, and stakeholders. Hence the importance 
of continuing trials and pilots. 
Despite the negative commentary from some commentators on the cost-benefits of BI, there 
is certainly scope for more radical approaches to redistribution and funding a more progressive 
and reinvigorated social state. A more radical approach will be to start taxing wealth in a fairer 
way as it is, arguably, the least taxed and most available source of funding.105 This may not 
be a silver bullet to solve all the ills of the Welfare State: but it would certainly be a starting 
point for improving current funding challenges and poor distributional outcomes, and as a 
necessary means of reversing the surge in  in-work and child poverty. Of particular interest 
are  proposals from the Institute of Public Policy Research. These take as their starting point 
the need to align levels of social spending with comparable European countries like Germany 
to create a new “investment state”. This would  take spending from the UK’s current 43 per 
cent of GDP to a potentially new high of 48 per cent by 2030. It estimates that this would permit 
£46 billion additional spending, funded by a mix of higher borrowing and progressive taxation 
policies: essentially, measures like taxing wealth in the same way as income, abolishing 
inheritance tax and introducing a gift tax, increasing corporation tax from 19% to 24%, and 
replacing council tax and stamp duty with an annual property tax.106  
The Covid-19 pandemic has brought unprecedented global disruption, with social security 
systems coming under pressure as never before. In the UK government measures have 
delivered massive support, including wages guarantees for “furloughed” employees and 
income replacement schemes for the self-employed.107 Nevertheless, sizeable gaps in the  
coverage began to appear from the start.108 Some of those excluded groups have undoubtedly 
 
104  For example, on a better off/worse off analysis on the complex issue of work incentives he considers that it is only possible 
to improve work incentives, on average, “if the poorest are made worse off”. Conversely, if the poorest are broadly protected then 
any changes would mean that some people would face worse incentives to work”; Portes, n.33, at p.21.  
105  K. Puttick, The Welfare State, Wages and Work: Disintegration or Renewal?, n.48 above, 76.  
106  H. Quilter-Pinner and D. Hochlaf, There is an alternative: Ending austerity in the UK (London: IPPR, 2019) 31-34. IPPR are 
supportive of a “living standards guarantee” to replace UC. This would rely in part on a “more comprehensive” social security 
system, including a greater degree of universalism and universal public services (UPS). As discussed earlier, a universal services-
based approach is also put forward by UCL’s Institute for Global Prosperity in preference to BI (Portes, Reed, Percy, n.33 above). 
This would build on the existing system of state provision of some services, but extend it:  a basket of basic services would be 
financed by taxation, replacing in part some cash benefits: “Ultimately, the broad objective  would be to extend the public provision 
of services as far as possible to enable individuals to live at a basic standard at significantly less direct financial cost.” (n.33, 
pp.22-24). 
107 Under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and the Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS); see 
COVID-19: Guidance for Employees, Employers and Businesses (HM Government: Support for Business, 3rd April 2020).  
108  For example, the CJRS only assisted employers in respect of employees who have completely stopped working, rather than 
those reducing their hours; and the system has done little for those with irregular or intermittent earnings (such as those on zero 
hours contracts) who may be limited to support based on preceding periods when earnings could have been very low. The SEISS 




been part of the sizeable (and growing) cohort that has had to look to the State and Universal 
Credit for the assistance they need.109  
It remains to be seen how effectively Universal Credit - now the system’s primary safety-net - 
will cope, particularly given its restrictive eligibility criteria, exclusions, and other features.110   
An even more intriguing question, going forward, is whether a simple BI - delivering a weekly 
transfer from the State directly to recipients, while maintaining other essential targeted 
programmes - could do better?  
The Covid-19 crisis could yet prove to be the catalyst for some fresh thinking on the matter. 
 
 
or who are newly self-employed. Treasury advice has been to claim UC. For a useful analysis, see S. Adam et al, “Fast choices 
by government provide generous income support to most workers, but leave some with nothing and others with too much” 
(London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2 April 2020: https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/14787). 
109  In the last 2 weeks of March 2020 alone nearly 1 million new UC claims were made, necessitating rapid re-deployment of 
10,000 staff to facilitate this (DWP, 25th March 2020). The value of support has been increased, with the standard allowance in 
UC (and basic element for working tax credit, paid as a legacy in-work benefit) increasing by £1,000 per year. The “minimum 
income floor” in UC was suspended for self-employed claimants affected by “self-isolation” requirements. Normally the MIF would 
attribute earnings equivalent to the full-time minimum wage (even if they are earning less), which after a means-test reduces the 
UC they can receive.  
110  For example, a 5-week “waiting period” before support normally begins, dependency on refundable loans in that period, and 
a lengthy payment cycle (normally monthly). It is not inconceivable that as take-up increases the government will relax 
requirements like the 5-week wait, move to a shorter payment cycle, and otherwise introduce easements.  
 
